A model of dynamic risk-sharing is constructed where agents meet pairwise and at random, and there is private information about endowments. Risk sharing is accomplished through dynamic contracts involving credit transactions, and through monetary exchange. A Friedman rule is optimal, and solutions are computed. The welfare costs of in ‡ation and the e¤ects of in ‡ation on the distribution of consumption and wealth are small for an economy calibrated to U.S. data. However, these e¤ects are large when the credit system is relatively unsophisticated.
INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in information technology have greatly improved our ability to move information across locations relative to our ability to move goods. Thus, while a particular transaction might be quite costly in terms of shipping goods or traveling to another location to inspect goods which are to change hands, the cost of transferring wealth from buyers to sellers has dropped dramatically. This decrease in transactions costs is re ‡ected in the growth in the use of alternatives to currency in transactions. In the United States between 1991 and 1995, the nominal value of payments by credit card increased by 81%, and the total nominal value of transactions over CHIPS and FedWire (electronic interbank transactions mechanisms) increased by 30.1% (see
Bank for International Settlements 1996).
In light of these developments, it would seem useful to develop models which allow us to study the use of alternative transactions media in environments where communication is sophisticated, but moving goods across locations is di¢cult. Such a model is considered here. We consider an environment where in…nitely-lived agents meet bilaterally and at random, much as in the monetary search models of Wright (1989, 1993) , Williamson and Wright (1994) , or Trejos and Wright (1995) . Here, in contrast to the typical monetary search environment, information can be transmitted across locations, so that long-term contracts, interpreted as credit arrangements, are possible. However, there are imperfections in the transmission of information which create a role for currency, so that money and credit can coexist.
The motive for exchange in this model is risk-sharing, as in the models studied in Aiyagari and Williamson (1997a , 1997b , 1997c . In this previous work, we used developments in the literature on dynamic contracts under private information (Green 1987 , Spear and Srivastava 1987 , Phelan and Townsend 1991 , Atkeson and Lucas 1992 , and Aiyagari and Alvarez 1995 to analyze dynamic credit arrangements and to model money and credit. The model considered here has much in common with Williamson (1997b, 1997c) , but those setups have no random matching; i.e. all trade takes place at a central location. Aiyagari and Williamson (1997a) is a pure credit version of the model considered here, but that other model has capital accumulation while this one does not. Our approach is related to work by Kocheralakota and Wallace (1997) , which in turn builds on Kocherlakota (1996) .
The Kocherlakota and Wallace model primarily relies on a commitment friction rather than on private information, and they do not compute solutions, as is done here.
In the model, there are two types of agents, those who are risk averse, and those who are risk neutral. Risk averse agents receive a random endowment each period that is private information. The endowments of risk neutral agents are constant over time. Each period, a risk averse agent is matched at random with a risk averse agent, and goods cannot be transported across locations. Transactions between a risk averse and risk neutral agent involve currency, and/or a centralized credit mechanism.
Currency is useful because, at random, information can not be perfectly transmitted through the credit mechanism. Further, risk sharing is limited by the fact that total consumption of any pair of risk averse and risk neutral agents is limited by the sum of their endowments.
A version of the Friedman rule is shown to hold in this environment. In particular, the transactions system works as well with an imperfect credit system and monetary exchange with de ‡ation at the rate of time preference of the risk neutral agent, as with a perfectly operating credit system. We are interested in computing steady state solutions, in order to study the e¤ects of in ‡ation and the e¤ects of improvements in the credit system given suboptimal rates of in ‡ation.
The main …ndings are the following. In ‡ation tends to increase the variability in consumption, conditional on the level of expected utility (which we might think of as a wealth variable). This e¤ect occurs as higher in ‡ation causes agents to hold less real cash balances, so that their ability to insure against income shocks, in instances where they cannot communicate through the credit system, is impaired. Higher in ‡ation also tends to reduce the variability in expected utilities across the population. These e¤ects are small for an economy calibrated to U.S. data. In fact, the cost for the average risk averse agent of eliminating currency entirely (for example by attempting to engineer an extremely high in ‡ation rate) is about 2% of consumption. However, for an economy where the credit system is very ine¢cient (there is a parameter in the model which quanti…es ine¢ciency), the quantitative e¤ects of in ‡ation on the distribution of consumption and wealth are substantial, as are the welfare e¤ects.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is constructed in Section 2, while Section 3 shows how e¢cient allocations are determined. In Section 4 we study the properties of a benchmark "pure credit" or e¢cient allocation. We show that a Friedman rule always achieves the pure credit allocation. Section 5 discusses calibration and the computational exercises, while Section 6 is a summary and conclusion.
THE MODEL
The population consists of a continuum of in…nite-lived agents with unit mass. Half of these agents are risk averse, with preferences given by
where 0 <¯< 1; c t is consumption, and u(¢) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satis…es decreasing absolute risk aversion. Assume that u(0) = 0 and u 0 (0) = 1:
The remaining agents are risk neutral, with preferences
where 0 < q < 1; and c t denotes consumption. Assume that risk neutral agents are more patient than risk averse agents, i.e. q >¯:
2 Each period, each risk averse agent is matched pairwise and at random with a risk neutral agent. During the period, goods cannot move between locations (i.e. from one matched pair of agents to another matched pair), but information can move freely (subject to some restrictions which I elaborate on below). The mechanism which governs the transfer of goods between the risk averse and risk neutral agents involves communication with a social planner at some centralized location. It may help to think of the social planner in this instance as a …nancial intermediary which performs commercial banking and central banking functions.
Two types of transactions can occur between risk averse and risk neutral agents; credit transactions and cash transactions. It will help to imagine that there is a "credit machine" and a "cash machine" at each location. The risk neutral agent receives a …xed endowment x at the beginning of each period. She is required (by the planner) to deposit this endowment for use by the credit and cash machines. At the beginning of period t, the risk averse agent receives a random endowment y t 2 fy 0 ; y 1 g;
where 0 · y 0 < y 1 : Endowments are i.i.d. over time and across risk averse agents.
Also, the endowment of a risk averse agent is private information. After receiving her endowment, the risk averse agent …rst accesses the credit machine, which has been programmed to recognize her, to exchange information (the particulars of which will be speci…ed below) with her, and to make transfers of consumption goods and currency contingent on this information. The risk averse agent then accesses the cash machine, which has been programmed at the beginning of the period to exchange currency for consumption goods at the price p t (i.e. the price level, which is the same across all locations).
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Both the cash machine and the credit machine have access to the same pool of goods, i.e. the quantity x which was deposited by the risk neutral agent.
We assume that any currency received by the credit or cash machines is destroyed, and that both machines have the capability of printing currency. Consumption goods can not be moved across locations, and any consumption goods not consumed by the risk averse agent are consumed by the risk neutral agent. We assume that risk neutral agents do not hold currency, but risk averse agents can carry currency from one period to the next.
EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS
The social planner is given Ã 0 (w 0 ; m 0 ); the distribution of date 0 expected utili- ; we have
That is, current per capita real balances minus per capita real balances in the previous period divided by the gross rate of return on money must equal the per capita money transfer to private agents in units of consumption goods. Now, following the approach in Aiyagari and Williamson (1996) as well as Aiyagari and Williamson (1997a,b,c) , which build on Atkeson and Lucas (1994) , we can solve the planning problem recursively, and as if it were the optimization problem of an individual risk neutral agent who meets a given risk averse agent forever. To simplify the problem in this way it is necessary that the endowment shocks of the risk averse agent be i.i.d., but it is not necessary that the "risk neutral agent" be risk neutral.
We con…ne attention to steady states, where°t =°; and ! t = ! for all t; where°a nd ! are constants. Also, the distribution of expected utilities and real money balances across risk averse agents, Ã(w; m); is constant in the steady state. We suppose that the social planner treats the price path fp t g 1 t=0 as given, and con…ne attention, as indicated, to the constant in ‡ation case. We will subsequently address how the planner chooses°optimally.
As is common in dynamic contracting problems, the expected utility, w; of the risk averse agent serves (though here only partially) as a summary statistic of the agent's period 0 level of expected utility and all subsequent reports (through the credit machine) of the agent's endowments. Here, we also need to include the risk averse agent's real cash balances, m; as of the beginning of the period, in order to impound all the relevant information. We can think of (w; m) as summarizing the risk averse agent's asset portfolio, where w can be interpreted as a credit balance. In a steady state, the planner's problem can be speci…ed in recursive form in terms of the following Bellman equation, where the function v(w; m) is the maximum level of expected utility of a risk neutral agent who is paired with a risk averse agent with an expected utility promise of w and real cash balances m; as if this pairing continued inde…nitely. We have 
(2) subject to w = (1 ¡¯) 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 ½¼u(y 1 + m + ¿ 1 (w; m) ¡°m 11 (w; m))
(1 ¡¯)u(y i + m + ¿ j (w; m) ¡°m 1j (w; m)) +¯w 1j (w; m); (i; j) = (1; 0); (0; 1);
(1 ¡¯)u(y i + m + ¿ (w; m) ¡°m 0j (w; m)) +¯w 0j (w; m); (i; j) = (1; 0); (0; 1);
x¸m + ¿(w; m) ¡°m 0i (w; m)¸¡y i ; i = 0; 1 m ij (w; m)¸0; i; j = 0; 1:
where w= ¼u(y 1 ¡y 0 ) and ¹ w = ¼u(y 1 +x)+(1¡¼)u(y 0 +x): In the problem above, the planner chooses ¿ i (w; m), the transfer the risk averse agent receives from the credit machine when it does not malfunction, when the risk averse agent's endowment is y i ; ¿ (w; m); the transfer from the credit machine when the machine malfunctions (note that this transfer can not be contingent on the risk averse agent's endowment);
w ij (w; m); the risk averse agent's expected utility in the next period when the credit machine is in mode i (i = 0 for malfunction) and the buyer's endowment is y j ; and m ij (w; m); the buyer's quantity of real cash balances at the beginning of the next period, with subscripts de…ned similarly. Here, (3) is a promise-keeping constraint,
and (4) and (5) are incentive constraints. The resource constraints at the credit machine and cash machine are given by (6) and (7), respectively.
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These are constraints on the net transfers from the credit and cash machines given by the nonnegativity constraints on the consumption of risk averse and risk neutral agents. The inequalities (8) are nonnegativity constraints on real cash balances, and (9) are constraints on expected utility promises, where w is the lowest level of expected utility which it is incentive compatible for the planner to force on any risk averse agent, and ¹ w is the highest possible level of expected utility, which results from the risk averse agent receiving the total endowment of the pair of agents in perpetuity.
Now that we have a recursive representation of the planner's problem, we can proceed to an analysis of steady state e¢cient allocations. We can think of solving for the steady state by …rst solving (2) subject to (3)- (9) to obtain v(w; m); and optimal transfers, expected utility promises, and real cash balance recommendations.
This then implies a dynamic stochastic path for (w; m) and we can accordingly solve for Ã(w; m); the steady state distribution of expected utility entitlements and real cash balances across buyers.
As in Aiyagari and Williamson (1997b) , it is straightforward to show that the problem (2) subject to (3)- (9) essentially collapses into a single-state-variable problem. That is, we can show that the value function takes the form
where µ(¢) is a function, and we can perform the change of variables
Then, the choice variables in the optimization problem (the variables with * superscripts) are independent of m: 5 Therefore, the risk neutral agent's current consumption allocation, future real cash balances, and future expected utility entitlement, are determined only by the current expected utility entitlement and the current endowment. Clearly, this simpli…cation will be important in computing solutions.
A PURE CREDIT ECONOMY
As a benchmark, it is useful to consider the special case where ½ = 1; so that cash machines are never used. That is, given that credit machines never malfunction, any transfers that can be achieved through the cash machine can be done at the credit machine, and with more information. Thus, cash machines are redundant, and we can think of this as a setup where money is not valued. The recursive problem for the planner then reduces to
(10) subject to
Here, z(w) is the value function, ¿ i (w) is the transfer to the risk averse agent through the credit machine when the buyer's endowment is y i ; and w i (w) is the future expected utility promise made to the risk averse agent when her endowment is y i : Equation (11) is the promise-keeping constraint, (12) and (13) are the incentive constraints, (14) are the resource constraints, and (15) describe the upper and lower bounds on expected utilities, with w and ¹ w de…ned as before.
The steady state allocation de…ned above is identical to the one analyzed in Aiyagari and Williamson (1996) . In that paper, we showed that the steady state allocation was e¢cient, and that there exists a unique limiting distribution Ã(w) which exhibits mobility. It is straightforward to show, following Aiyagari and Williamson (1997b) , that when ½ 6 = 1;°= q is optimal, i.e. a Friedman rule which drives the nominal interest rate to zero achieves the e¢cient allocation (i.e. the pure credit allocation).
We can prove this by showing that, when ½ 6 = 1; and°= q, the problem (2) subject to (3)- (9) is equivalent to (10)-(15).
CALIBRATION AND COMPUTATION
From Section 4, we know that a Friedman rule result holds in this economy so that, even if the credit system is imperfect (i.e. ½ < 1) the correct monetary policy can make up for this completely. What we would now like to investigate, is how wrong things can go when the monetary growth rate is suboptimal in the steady state, solving the planner's problem for a given suboptimal°. In particular, in this section we will investigate the quantitative e¤ects of in ‡ation for a given value of ½ (i.e. …xing the credit friction), and the e¤ects of increasing ½ with the in ‡ation rate …xed.
The …rst step is to calibrate the model by choosing functional forms and reasonable parameter values. The utility function I use is u(c) = 1 ¡ e ¡®c ; with ® = 1; which implies a coe¢cient of relative risk aversion of unity at the mean endowment (which will be unity). A constant absolute risk aversion utility function is convenient for computational purposes in this model as it is bounded. We interpret a period as one quarter, and set y 0 , y 1 ; and ¼ so as to match the variability in quarterly household income. Using PSID data, Aiyagari (1994) argues that a …rst-order autoregression closely matches the time series properties of annual earnings, with a range of .23 to .53 for the …rst-order serial correlation coe¢cient, and a coe¢cient of variation in unconditional earnings of 20 to 40 percent. Since it is not tractable to introduce serial correlation in endowments for risk averse agents, we must do the best we can to …t an i.i.d. endowment shock in the model to the data. This is not too problematic, as the estimated serial correlation in annual data is low, and serial correlation for quarterly data would then be even lower. If we take the coe¢cient of variation to be 30 percent for annual data, then if quarterly income is i.i.d., the coe¢cient of variation for quarterly data would be 60 percent. Thus, we set ¼ = :5; y 0 = 1 ¡ ²; and y 1 = 1 + ²; with ² = :6: The remaining parameters are¯; q; ½; and°: We assumed at the outset that q >¯; which is required for there to exist a limiting distribution of expected utilities with mobility. 
and the steady state quantity of credit transactions is We want to set ½ so that Tc Tc+Tnc = :24: When the Federal Reserve survey was done, the in ‡ation rate was approximately 1% per quarter, so we set°= 1:01 for calibration purposes.
Solutions were computed as follows. First, grids were chosen for the two state variables, w and m: The lower bound on the expected utility of the risk averse agent is ¼u(y 1 ¡ y 0 ) + (1 ¡ ¼)u(0); which is the minimum incentive compatible level of expected utility that can be imposed on a risk averse agent, and the lower bound on m is zero. The upper bound on expected utility is ¼u(y 1 + x) + (1 ¡¼)u(y 0 + x): Since choice variables in the planner's problem are independent of m; it is only necessary to solve the problem at each point along the w grid, and for a single value for m; say m = 0; and then use this solution to determine what the solution is for all points on the grid. We make an initial guess for the function µ(w); and then use value iteration to arrive at the solution for µ(w). At each iteration, µ(w) is updated by …tting a third-order Chebychev polynomial (plus an additional term, 1 1¡w
; which performed well in …tting the value function), to the values computed for the value function at points on the grid on the previous iteration. When convergence is achieved, then the decision rules are interpolated across a …ner grid, and a matrix of Markov transition probabilities for the state w is constructed as an approximation using a lottery over the two closest grid points. A limiting distribution over w is then computed.
To match the real interest rate and the evidence from the Federal Reserve survey on household transactions, we set q and¯very close to :99 (i.e. º is very small, on the order of 10 ¡5 ; in the steady state to achieve the desired split of the surplus between risk neutral and risk averse agents), and ½ = :81:
E¤ects of In ‡ation With Parameters Set at Calibrated Values
We …rst consider the e¤ects on the steady state for parameters calibrated to the U.S. economy, as described above. The results are in Figures 1 through 4 , and Table   1 . Figures 1 and 2 show results for the pure credit economy, which as we have shown is equivalent to the Friedman rule economy (q =°) for any ½:
In Figure 1 , consumption pro…les in the high and low income state for the risk averse agent are plotted against w; expected utility. Note that, conditional on expected utility, there is very little variability in consumption, at least for the middle range of expected utilities. Near the upper bound on expected utilities, however, the pairwise resource constraint (14) binds, i.e. achieving something close to full insurance for the risk averse agent would require more consumption goods in the low income state than the risk averse agent and the risk neutral agent have between them. Also, near the lower bound on expected utilities, insurance against the income shock for the risk averse agent is poor, as the lower bound on expected utilities (15) binds. That is, due to the fact that the lower bound on expected utilities restricts possible future penalties, there must be a larger gap between current consumption in the high-income and low-income states to induce truth-telling. Figure 2 shows the limiting distribution of expected utilities in the pure credit economy. The bimodal feature of the distribution is associated with the binding pairwise resource constraints, a characteristic which makes the allocation problem here di¤er-ent from one in an environment where all agents meet in one location. The limiting distributions studied in Aiyagari and Williamson (1997b, c) tend to be unimodal.
It is di¢cult to give clear intuition for why the binding resource constraints create a tendency toward bimodal limiting distributions other than to point out that the binding resource constraint for high w works through the binding incentive constraint (for the agent with high income) to alter the law of motion for w in such a way that agents near the mean of the distribution will drift either up or down, while agents with high w tend to drift down and those with low w drift up. Note that, comparing
Figures 1 and 2, a signi…cant fraction of risk averse agents will face binding resource constraints (and therefore poor consumption smoothing) for high w; but a negligible fraction of agents su¤er poor consumption smoothing for low w:
[Insert Table 1 here.]
Now we examine how in ‡ation a¤ects the steady state, …xing ½ at its calibrated value, ½ = :81: In Table 1 , the entries in the rows are, respectively, annualized in‡ation rates, the mean expected utility in the steady state of risk averse agents, the standard deviation of expected utility for risk averse agents, the standard deviation of consumption for risk averse agents, the fraction of the value of total transactions accounted for by currency, a measure of the distance between the Friedman rule (-3.94% annual in ‡ation) steady state distribution of expected utilities and the computed steady state distribution of expected utilities for risk averse agents (described in more detail below), the welfare cost of in ‡ation as a fraction of consumption for the average risk averse agent, and a similar measure for the risk neutral agent. The welfare costs to each type of agent in rows 7 and 8 of Table 1 For the risk neutral agent, the corresponding welfare measure (in row 8) is just the change in average consumption for risk neutral agents, divided by consumption in the Friedman rule economy.
What is called a "welfare cost" in row 6 of Table 1 is a measure of the distance between the Friedman rule distribution and the relevant suboptimal distribution of expected utilities for risk averse agents. It is useful to look at this measure, as there can be e¤ects of in ‡ation on the distribution which will not show up in changes in the mean. Since for the distance measure we use it is necessary that limiting probabilities be bounded away from zero, we use a kernel estimation technique (Silverman 1986) to derive an estimated limiting density function for the expected utilities of risk averse agents. That is, we estimate the density function f (x) associated with the limiting distribution of expected utilities of risk averse agents by
where h is the "window width," p i is the limiting probability associated with expected utility level w i ; n is the number of grid points for expected utilities, and K(¢) is a probability density function. For K(¢); we used the standard normal density function.
Choosing a grid for x; we let f j = f (x j ) for j = 1; 2; :::;`; and then compute the "welfare loss," Z(g; f ) associated with the limiting distribution f (x); by
where g(x) denotes the limiting distribution under a Friedman rule. This distance measure is adapted from an approach in information theory used by Kullback (1959) .
The primary e¤ect of an increase in the in ‡ation rate is to reduce the average quantity of real cash balances held by each risk averse agent. As a result, these agents are less capable of smoothing consumption when they can not use the credit machine to smooth consumption given their income shock. Thus, conditional on expected utility, the variability of consumption should increase, but given that the incentive structure is also a¤ected, there will be a change in the steady state distribution of expected utilities. Table 1 shows that the mean level of expected utility for risk averse agents decreases with in ‡ation, while the standard deviation of expected utilities …rst increases and then falls. The standard deviation of consumption across risk averse agents decreases and then increases with in ‡ation. The e¤ects on welfare are quite small, as shown by rows 7 and 8 of Table 1 . In particular, the cost of driving money out of the system completely, which would occur if an in ‡ation rate in excess of about 2,000% per annum were attempted, is only about 2% of consumption for the average risk averse agent (see column 5 of Table 1 ). Thus, the costs of in ‡ation here are an order of magnitude lower than the costs calculated by Cooley and Hansen (1989) for a real business cycle model with a cash-in-advance constraint. The di¤erence in welfare costs is primarily due to the fact that there is an alternative in this model to making transactions with cash whereas there are no such alternatives in cash-inadvance or related representative-agent approaches to monetary analysis. Further, there are no e¤ects of in ‡ation on labor-leisure choice (Cooley and Hansen 1989), growth (Dotsey and Ireland 1996) , or the costs of credit (Lacker and Schreft 1996) .
In Table 1 , the fraction of the value of transactions using currency falls with in ‡ation, but not markedly so for low rates of in ‡ation. In moving from a Friedman rule to a 10% in ‡ation, the percentage of transactions involving currency drops only a small amount, from 24.5% to 23.8%.
Figures 3 and 4 show consumption pro…les given ½ = :81 and 10% annual in ‡a-tion. Figure 3 shows consumption in the high (c11) and low (c10) income states when the risk averse agent is able to smooth consumption through the credit system, while Figure 4 shows the corresponding consumption pro…les when the agent smooths consumption by using money. Under the Friedman rule, Figures 3 and 4 would be identical, but here we can see the e¤ect of a moderate in ‡ation in increasing the variability of consumption, conditional on expected utility, in Figure 4 . Figure 5 shows the di¤erence between the Friedman rule limiting distribution and the limiting distribution when money is driven out of the economy. The "eyeball distance" between the two distributions seems small, which is consistent with the small welfare costs of in ‡ation in rows 7 and 8 of Table 1 . This tells us that, in terms of the "welfare cost" in row 6 of Table 1 , 3 is a small number. This will be useful as a benchmark for the next section.
In ‡ation In an Economy with a Poor Credit System
In the previous section, with parameters calibrated to U.S. data, the welfare e¤ects of in ‡ation and the social value of currency were very small. Further, given that most evidence (see for example Bank for International Settlements 1996) indicates that non-cash transactions media have seen increased use in the U.S. relative to currency recently, these costs should be viewed as upper bounds. However, it would be useful to know how in ‡ation a¤ects an economy where the payments system is less sophisticated. In the model, ½ measures the e¢ciency of the payments system, and in this section we will replicate the computational exercises of the previous section for an economy identical in all respects, except that ½ = :05; an arbitrarily-chosen number close to zero. Note that if ½ = 1 then the credit system works perfectly and money is not valued, while if ½ = 0 transactions using cash are the only means for smoothing consumption in the face of idiosyncratic shocks to income.
[Insert Table 2 here.]
The entries in Table 2 correspond to those in Table 1 . Note in particular that the welfare costs of in ‡ation, in terms of the e¤ects on the risk averse agent, are much larger in Table 2 than in Table 1 . The much larger numbers in row 6 of Table 2 indicate that in this economy in ‡ation induces much more pronounced e¤ects on the distribution of expected utilities across risk averse agents. Also, in row 7 of the table, the welfare e¤ects on the average risk averse agent are also much larger, to the point where the average risk averse agent would be willing to give up almost 7% of average consumption to live in an economy with a Friedman rule rate of in ‡ation, rather than an economy without currency (as compared to about 2% in Table 1 ).
Note also that, in row 3 of Table 2 , the standard deviation of expected utilities for risk averse agents drops dramatically at high rates of in ‡ation. Figure 6 shows the distributions of expected utilities corresponding to the Friedman rule economy and the economy where money is not held. Here, when there is no currency (but the need for it is great), there is not only a large decrease in the dispersion of expected utilities across risk averse agents, but the distribution also becomes unimodal rather than bimodal. This is due mainly to the fact that the decrease in dispersion implies that the resource constraint in the planner's problem (7) does not bind. As was mentioned earlier, this constraint will tend to bind only for high values of w; and if it binds this tends to produce a bimodal distribution of expected utilities.
In row 4 of Table 2 , the e¤ect of in ‡ation on the variability in consumption is nonmonotonic, re ‡ecting the e¤ects of two opposing forces. The …rst force is due to the fact that higher in ‡ation tends to increase the variability in consumption given the level of expected utility, since risk averse agents are less able to smooth consumption with lower cash balances. The second force is that the variability in consumption will tend to fall as the variability in expected utilities falls, since average (across income states) consumption increases monotonically with w: For low rates of in ‡ation the second e¤ect dominates, while for high rates of in ‡ation the …rst does.
Perhaps surprisingly, the fraction of the value of transactions accounted for by currency (row 5 in Table 2 ) increases with the in ‡ation rate at low levels of in ‡ation, and then decreases. There are two opposing forces at work here. First, in ‡ation has a tendency to decrease real cash balances conditional on expected utility, for each risk averse agent. As a result, given the distribution of expected utilities across risk averse agents, money is used less in transactions as the in ‡ation rate increases. The second e¤ect is related to the fact that the distribution of expected utilities changes with in ‡ation. When w is high, the resource constraint (7) tends to bind, which implies that there is a sense in which risk averse agents can not purchase all the goods they want given prices. They know this in advance, when they visit the credit machine, and therefore tend to get less currency than otherwise to make purchases from the cash machine. This problem becomes more acute as w approaches its upper bound, where there will be no currency transactions even if the credit machine malfunctions.
An increase in the in ‡ation rate tends to reduce the dispersion in the distribution of expected utilities which then causes the fraction of risk averse agents whose cash purchases are constrained to decrease. This then has the e¤ect of tending to increase the average quantity of money held, and the quantity of monetary transactions for the population as a whole. At low rates of in ‡ation, the second e¤ect dominates, while the …rst e¤ect dominates at high rates of in ‡ation.
We have studied a random matching model with private information in which risk averse agents insure against idiosyncratic income shocks through long-term credit arrangements and by holding money. The credit system is imperfect in that, at random, agents may not be able to communicate fully with the centralized credit agency. In spite of this imperfection, the transactions system will work perfectly, i.e. the steady state allocation is e¢cient, if the quantity of money is governed by a Friedman rule, with de ‡ation at the rate of time preference of the risk neutral agents in the model. Solutions to the model were computed to determine the quantitative e¤ects of suboptimal money growth, …rst in an economy calibrated to U.S. data, and second in an economy with a relatively unsophisticated credit system. In general, the variability in consumption, conditional on the level of expected utility at the beginning of the period, tends to increase with in ‡ation, and the variability in expected utilities across the population tends to decrease. In the …rst case, the welfare e¤ects of in ‡ation are quite small, but these welfare e¤ects increase dramatically in the second case where cash transactions are much more important.
The primary di¤erence between this model and the ones in Aiyagari and Williamson (1997b,c) is the random matching feature, so it would be useful at this point to discuss how random matching matters for the solution to the problem, and its implications for the results. In some random matching models, for example the absence-of-doublecoincidence monetary environments studied by Wright (1989, 1993) , random matching not only restricts how goods may move among economic agents; it makes more palatable the assumption that information does not ‡ow between pairs of would-be trading partners, or over time. In our environment, as in models studied by Kocherlakota (1996) , Aiyagari and Williamson (1997a) , and Kocherlakota and Wallace (1997a) , information does ‡ow across locations (though perhaps with some friction which provides a role for money), which permits a role for credit arrangements. Now, the fact that information is communicated to a central location in our model implies that the problem solved by a social planner here is much like the problems solved in Aiyagari and Williamson (1997b, c) in environments where all agents meet in a central location. There are two primary di¤erences here implied by random matching. First, random matching implies a resource constraint on pairwise allocations. Clearly if the constraint binds, it matters, and solutions were computed in the paper where this constraint was binding (and mattered in a big way for the resulting allocation) and where it was not. Second, solutions are computed as if there were a social planner associated with each level of expected utility of the risk averse agent, with all these planners trading on a bond market at a …xed interest rate. This …xed interest rate is the discount rate for the risk neutral agent. In Aiyagari and Williamson (1997b, c) , we study economies with an endogenous interest rate, while Aiyagari and Williamson (1997a) is an endogenous interest rate economy with random matching and capital accumulation. We did not follow Aiyagari and Williamson (1997a) in allowing capital accumulation, as the approach here is somewhat less computationally taxing, and because the form of capital accumulation in Aiyagari and Williamson (1997a) would not add a great deal of additional insight.
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Dealing with some types of commitment issues in this random matching environment could be somewhat di¢cult, though it would be straightforward to permit reversion to autarky here, as in Kocherlakota and Wallace (1997) . Perhaps more interesting are the commitment issues examined in Aiyagari and Williamson (1997b) , where agents can abandon long-term credit arrangements but are still able to trade on a competitive money market. In that type of environment, a Friedman rule is no longer optimal, as higher in ‡ation improves incentives by causing a decrease in the value of defecting.
This model might be successfully applied to other payments system issues, as spatial separation and the ‡ow of information seems key to the analysis of such issues (see also Freeman 1996 Freeman , 1997 . For example, the random matching environment might lend itself to the study of the optimal design of payments systems subject to systemic risk. Consumers might write long-term contracts with …nancial intermediaries at spatially dispersed locations, with costly communication between these intermediaries and some central agency through which settlement might be made. Now, suppose there were some risk associated with each …nancial intermediary and its ability to meet its obligations through the centralized settlement mechanism. We might then ask how individual intermediaries would trade o¤ the costs of communication and settlement against the costs associated with bearing system-wide risk, and whether they would choose to make this tradeo¤ in a socially optimal way. with q >¯; which then implies that there is a steady state limiting distribution with mobility. The model is set up in such a way that capital accumulation decisions are independent of the problem determining the allocation of consumption goods at each location. 
